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
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
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IMPLICATIONS OF THE MILITARY REFORM MOVEMENT FOR THE ARMY'S PPBES

BY

W. BRUCE GRAY, DAC

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A superior mental construct would be the Clausewitzian notion of the Center of Gravity. From Center of Gravity-based reasoning can be derived clear, stable, and persuasive concepts which serve over the long term to provide criteria for force design decisions. The same concepts provide the basis for influencing the political consensus which is decisive in getting balanced resource programs funded.

With Center of Gravity analysis as a continuing thread, the reform movements major themes are dealt with in terms of history, national values, the national planning system, development of strategy, the Congress, the bureaucracy, and PPBES itself.

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

IMPLICATIONS OF THE MILITARY REFORM MOVEMENT
FOR THE ARMY'S PPBES

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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15 May 1986

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ABSTRACT

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The military reform movement in the United States holds that there are several problems with the US military establishment. These problems are in the broad areas of organization, warfighting concepts, and technology and equipment. In all of these areas money is a major issue and thus inherently interesting to PPBES. Many of the problems identified by the movement and the misconceptions held by them and others can be traced to the instability inherent in an objectives based national planning system with a short term perspective.

A superior mental construct would be the Clausewitzian notion of the Center of Gravity. From Center of Gravity based reasoning can be derived clear, stable and persuasive concepts which serve over the long term to provide criteria for force design decisions. The same concepts provide the basis for influencing the political consensus which is decisive in getting balanced resource programs funded.

With Center of Gravity analysis as a continuing thread, the reform movements major themes are dealt with in terms of history, national values, the national planning system, development of strategy, the Congress, the bureaucracy, and PPBES itself.

PREFACE

The project was conceived by the author. The Directorate of Command, Leadership, and Management at the War College endorsed the proposal and witnessed its evolution. Originally, it had been my intent to draw upon my considerable experience as analyst in order to describe the impact of the military reform movement in the Army's PPBES. As I studied the subject, it became increasingly apparent that the causal relationships between the movement and PPBES were much more subtle than I had anticipated. It also became increasingly apparent that there were many views on the nature and implications of those relationships and these views were supported by very uneven scholarship. As it turned out, the broad perspective provided by the Army War College curriculum shaped the ultimate pattern of this inquiry. Particularly helpful were the advise and course material/speakers provided by COL Fred Hillyard, Dr. Elizabeth Pickering, and Dr. Michael Alfield, all of the Army War College faculty.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This effort was prompted by the author's personal desire to come to a better understanding of how the resource management community in the Army could improve the manner in which it develops and sells its resource packages at the national level. Being a management analyst by training it was my assumption that I would be able to develop a set of mechanical observations and recommendations dealing with the specifics of the process. The military reform movement was used as a vehicle because it was seen as providing insights into what the problems might be. Further, the movement was seen as increasingly influencing the Congress.

The research consisted of an extensive review of literature. Also, numerous speakers at the War College spoke on the reform movement and the PPBES system.

The paper begins with a review of the military reform movement itself. The major issues of the reform movement are listed with the understanding that the specific list presented is one which the author has abstracted from a wide variety of sources.

Several pages are devoted to describing the membership of the movement. The intent is to portray a group of various backgrounds, ideologies, interests and by implication different national agendas. The members of the movement tend to have different reasons for their interest in it. The implications for PPBES are discussed.

Space is devoted to the history of reform movements and what really constitutes a reform movement. It is concluded that a true reform

movement deals with national values and is really attempting to alter the national consensus.

The problems identified by the movement are dealt with indirectly as the paper proceeds through the subjects of reform history, national values, national planning, strategy, the Congress, bureaucracies and finally PPBES. In reality the environment of the PPBES is the thrust of the paper and so the final chapter on PPBES will seem anticlimactic to those seeking definitive mechanical solutions.

CHAPTER II

THE MILITARY REFORM MOVEMENT

SUMMARIZING THE MOVEMENT

The military reform movement is a loosely connected collection of academics, congressmen, congressional staffers, US Military, DOD civilians, journalists and intellectuals. These people share the conviction that there are serious problems with the US Military. If asked to detail these problems, no two "reformers" would draft identical lists. Nevertheless, the items in the individual lists would tend to coalesce into three traditional broad problematical areas: organization; technology/procurement; and doctrinal/conceptual.¹ The list is as follows:

1. Organizational problems

- The US military establishment has become consumed by its bureaucratic roles to the detriment of its war fighting roles.
 - The most consuming bureaucratic role is the PPBES.
 - The most detrimental influence is the "careerism" of US military officers. This careerism is the real cause of the huge, hyperactive, misdirected, duplicative military bureaucracy.
- The JCS is severely flawed. It is dominated by the very services that is supposed to lead. It has been rendered largely impotent by a consensus decision making process corrupted by the service loyalties of its participants.
- The nation is building the wrong conventional force.

--We are buying an offensive naval force (600 ship navy)
at the expense of a land force when our main threat is a
continental land force.

--We are buying an air force designed for all weather
nuclear offense and defense at the expense of
conventional air supremacy in Central Europe, as well
as, close air support for ground operations.

--We are buying an Army whose bloated support structure of
combat service support and combat support troops is
being purchased unwisely at the expense of combat
forces.

2. Problems with technology and the procurement of equipment

- The US military pays too much for its equipment.
- The technology of that equipment is too complicated and thus
undependable for conventional combat.
- That equipment takes far too long to develop.

3. Our war fighting concepts are flawed

- The national planning system does not work.
- Our doctrine is preparing us for attrition warfare which is
pointless since we are outnumbered and outgunned.

Consequently we should employ a Jacksonian/Wehrmacht style
of maneuver warfare. This warfare emphasizes the use of
grand scale maneuver employing corps sized reserve
forces.(2)

IMPLICATIONS FOR PPBES

The three areas of problems which have proceeded from the reform movement have significant implications for PPBES. First, the reformers imply that the method by which DOD attempts to design its future and then obtain funds for that future is operating at least partially in reverse sequence, i.e., the process of obtaining funds has undue influence upon design.³ Second, the reformers support solutions which by implication would almost invariably reduce costs. Consequently, many reformers say that the US should be able to buy more combat power with the money being given DOD. Of course, the logical corollary is that the US should be able to buy the current level of combat power for less money, freeing that money for other priorities.

The reform movement, then, is ultimately suggesting that the budgeting system is buying the wrong force. It is also suggesting that the ultimate product of the DOD budgeting system, Total Obligational Authority (TOA), can be cut by the members of Congress with a clear conscience.

THE MEMBERS OF THE REFORM MOVEMENT

To understand the perspective of the movement, it is important to know its members. Such a review will reveal a broad spectrum of backgrounds and agendas and, by implication, motives.

The most prominent component of the reform movement is the Military Reform Caucus which was cofounded in 1980 by Senator Gary Hart (D-Col) and by Representative William Whitehurst (R-Va). The caucus sprang from no particular ideological base: Senator Hart began his political career

as George McGovern's campaign manager and Congressman Whitehurst has an ADA rating of zero.⁴ At Appendix A is a recent list of the members of the Military Reform Caucus.⁵ A brief perusal of the list confirms that the membership remains representative of a broad spectrum of political ideology. A closer examination might give a member of the military establishment some pause. Naturally, many liberal members of the caucus may be presumed to have an overriding desire to cut the defense budget.⁶ However, to many conservatives, the appeal may be due as much to their anti-Washington streak as it is to their desire to improve the military. For example, Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa), a member of the caucus, calls military contractors "Welfare queens."⁷

A key linking pin between the caucus and many of the thinkers who gravitate around the movement is Mr. William Lind, an aide to Senator Hart. In and out of Congress, Mr. Lind appears to be regarded as a seminal theorist/historian who serves up a stimulating agenda. He does not appear to be described as a definitive thinker who indisputably describes the necessary outcome.⁸ Mr. Lind must be deemed at least partially responsible for turning the attention of the caucus members from line item details to the large issues of organization, doctrine and technology.

Three key popularizers were journalist/speechwriter James Fallows who wrote National Defense in 1981; Dena Rasor a promoter who founded the Project for Military Procurement (a collection point for stories about procurement snafus' such as the \$2,000 coffee pot); and Edward Luttwak of Georgetown University who wrote The Pentagon and the Art of War.⁹ Of the three, Professor Luttwak is a serious scholar. The public awareness created by these writings also contributed to

congressional interest.

A key member of the military reform network was Col. John Boyd USAF (Ret.) who was the author of a DOD briefing called "Patterns of Conflict." In this briefing he drew upon his experience as a Korean War F-86 pilot to describe the normal combat sequence: observation-orientation-decision-action. The cycles are seen as time competitive and the objective should be to go through them faster than the enemy.¹⁰

Another member of the movement includes Dr. Stephen Canby who graduated from West Point. Subsequently, he worked at the Infantry School and the Rand Corporation. He is now an independent defense analyst. Norman Polmar was the editor of the American portion of Jane's Fighting Ships from 1967-1977. He is currently a consultant to various organizations including OSD and USN, RD&A. Drs. Richard Gabriel and Paul Savage of St. Anselm College are part of the network.¹¹ Pierre Sprey, an engineer and statistician, led the design team for the A-10 and helped start the F-16.¹² As an assistant in OSD, he developed the briefing entitled "The Case for More Effective, Less Expensive Weapons Systems," i.e. "...complicated weapons were often outfought by simpler ones."¹³ He encouraged changes in weapons acquisition, competitive procurement, operational testing, and competitive prototyping.¹⁴ Mr. Franklin G. Spinney, defense Department analyst, developed the briefing, "Defense Facts of Life." This briefing claimed that

...spending patterns of the Pentagon - skewed by among other things, an infatuation with complexity - yielded a military that was smaller, weaker and less well prepared than it ought to be.¹⁵

Dr. Jeffrey Record, a senior fellow at the Institute for Foreign

Policy Analysis and adjunct Professor of Military History at Georgetown University is a former aid of Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia. He and Luttwak (also with Georgetown) are highly influential among those who think seriously about reform issues but they are not tightly linked to the inner circle of reformers. Record pointedly divorces himself from them in his articles and Luttwak is conspicuously absent from the Hart/Lind list of reformers. There are others even further from the inner circle who have contributed to reform thinking such as COL Harry Summers formerly of the US Army War College and now with U.S. News and World Report.

People like Summers, Record and Luttwak all differ from the inner circle on specific issues and from one another. This points to the central problem of describing "membership" in the movement--there is no orthodoxy! Nevertheless since 1980 its members have acquired a national agenda and have acquired significant influence in the Congress. They must be taken seriously.

HISTORY OF MILITARY REFORM

In the recent history of western democracies there have been a number of military reforms. Reviewing the impulse and the results of these reforms can prove instructive to the person studying the current military reform movement in the US

The most obvious conclusion is that many military reforms fail:

- The French, prompted by Aube and Charriers of the French navy, decided to replace their battle ships with a panacea weapon--the torpedo boat. This military reform movement was lead by the left because it would reduce military costs and

strike a severe blow at the privately held French steel industry. The left saw this military reform as a victory for its social and economic campaign. Unhappily, the boat failed. The fleet stagnated and the Navy endured the shame of Fashoda in 1898.¹⁷

- In the 1890's, Ferdinand Foch led a movement to reform French land forces. Foch developed an offensive doctrine predicated on "racial vitality." The French race would defeat Germany through superior energy and fury, i.e., frontal infantry assaults. Thus "the Army became the instrument of French national regeneration." The defeat of 1870-71 would not be repeated. The horrible results of the resulting doctrine employed in World War I testify to the failure of the reform.¹⁸
- Between the World Wars, Basil Liddell Hart urged Britain to adopt the Strategy of Indirect Approach geared to peripheral military operation rather than commitment to the European continental central front. This was designed to continue Britain's role as the "keeper of the balance of power" while at the same time limiting her liabilities. This strategy helped lead Hore-Belisha away from the reequipment of the British Expeditionary Force and preparation for the ultimate continental commitment.¹⁹
- The B-17 bomber was reputed to render surface combat ships obsolete and it was cheaper. "The promise of B-17 air dominance created a reliance on those bombers for the

defense of the Philippines and a false sense of security that was rudely stripped away in 1941."²⁰

Though many of the reforms failed, others succeeded during the same period of time.

- While the French were building Torpedo boats, Fisher was urging the British to exploit breakthroughs in naval technology. "His solution led to more expensive and larger individual ships." He saw them as being the only way that Britain could protect its traditional interests around the world as well as protect its home waters. As a result when World War I started, Britain was able to protect its lines of communication and its home waters as well as fight on the continent.²¹
- In the US, Mahan arrived at similar conclusions. If the US was to have world wide economic interests, it must have a powerful navy. He "showed how war at sea was won with superior concentrations of capital ships." "US policy could no longer be tied to coastal defense."²²
- During 1812-13, the Prussians created a Landwehr. This army was provided by the East Prussian states without permission of the King. The army not only helped defeat Napoleon but it also provided the basis for a subsequent unified Prussian state.²³

The reforms which did not work were based upon false assumptions, hidden agendas and a weakness for the easy solution. The reforms which did work were based on a clear understanding of national interest and were in tune with national values and the nations commitment to the

reform agenda. The successful naval reforms resulted in force design changes which bought equipment that was expensive, and complicated and extremely effective. History clearly demonstrates that the reformers condemnation of expense and complication of equipment is misguided.

The interests and values were sorted out during national, public debates.

Reform of the military is nearly always linked to an internal debate about the purpose of military force for the society and its elected government both at home and abroad.²⁴

WHAT IS MILITARY REFORM?

Michael E. Vlahos says,

Since the organization of a nation's army reflects not only the parameters of foreign policy but also the nature of its polity, the army is first and foremost the upholder of national values, and only second, and in corollary, the instrument of external defense.²⁵

Vlahos makes several more points:

- Reform is not the same as innovation
 - Innovation seeks change but reform goes far beyond that.
- "Reform...insinuates far more than improvements in efficiency and capability. Reform movements envision more fundamental shifts in public and national policy..."²⁶

An obvious example of a military issue which involves national values is the conscript army. Most western democracies have conscript armies. The United States does not and has not had one for most of its history. This value has a significant impact on how much the US pays for its military force. Over 50% of the US Army's FY 87 budget is for manpower.²⁷

Another example of a military issue which involves national values is the worth attached to the life and safety of people. This value is reflected clearly in the debate over the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. Its critics charge that it does not protect its occupants from various forms of enemy fire such as enemy tank rounds and anti-tank missiles. The Army responds that it was never designed to do so just as its predecessor, the M113 had not been. In reality, the Bradley is a dual purpose machine which carries soldiers to the fight and then fights BMP's so that the Abrams tank can fight other tanks. The point in that debate is not hinging on the merits of the machine in combat but rather its performance vis-a-vis a national value.

Consideration for life and safety increase the cost and development time of weapons due to the influence on MILSPECS and the influence on concepts of fighting wars. Safely designed equipment costs more money and takes longer to develop than equipment produced from designs predicated solely upon efficiency. Fire Power based combat capability consumes more equipment and technology and therefore costs more money than maneuver dependent capabilities which put individual soldiers at greater risk.

Traditionally, civilian control of the military has been an American value. This is so true that it has been said that American military reform "probably includes only one constant: it must not endanger civilian control of the military."²⁸ This must be a key consideration when developing alternatives for reorganizing the top echelons of the military establishment such as JCS.

Some values conflict. At the national level most thinking people of conscience desire a strong national defense but at the same time want to

assure that people in need do not suffer. Unfortunately, it is true that on the margin,, the government (which is in reality the major allocator of values) must choose between defense and welfare. The choices that the members of government will make will in reality, reflect their perception of the national consensus.

The reform movement then must be understood within the context of the development of the national consensus on values and the Congress' perception of that consensus. For the Army and the US Military, the problem is that they want to keep what the Reagan budgets have given them. The reform movement is saying to many people that some of that Reagan buildup is being wasted by the US military and that, consequently, the military budget is a candidate for dealing with a new national priority namely reducing the budget deficit.

Further lessons for the reformers and the Army are that no major change can fly in the face of national values. Either the values must be changed or the initiative abandoned. In fact, in this world of coalition warfare, the criterion of independent national values should be applied to any major decision affecting the alliance.

Since reforms are sometimes wrong, and since they must develop within the context of national values, then they should be the subject of national debate.

...any program for change must be...compared to its alternatives, as well as to the conventional wisdom that it would replace.²⁹

The reform movement, particularly as it manifests itself in the Congress has not shrunk from debate but rather has appeared to control

its agenda. The Army's participation in this debate must proceed from an appreciation for and understanding of our national values.

ENDNOTES

1. Michael E. Vlahos, "Military Reform in Historical Perspective," Orb's, A Journal of World Affairs, Volume 27, Number 2, Summer 1983, p. 247. Note that the particulars under the three groups were abstracted by me.

2. Kevin N. Lewis, "On the Appropriate Use of Technology," Orbis, A Journal of World Affairs, Volume 27, Number 2, Summer 1983, p. 292.

3. Jacques Gansler, "How to Improve the Acquisition of Weapons," in Reorganizing Americas Defense, ed. Robert J. Art, et al, Pergamon Press, McLean, VA 1985, p. 383.

4. Richard Brookhiser, "Reform or Retreat? Rescuing the Military," National Review, February 14, 1986, p. 38

5. The list was provided informally to Dr. Elizabeth Pickering of the US Army War college staff in March of 1986 by a member of the staff of the US Senate.

6. James Reed, "Congress and the Politics of Defense Reform," in The defense Reform Debate: Issues and Analysis, ed. Asa V. Clark, IV et al, the Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1984, p. 243.

7. Brookhiser, p. 39.

8. This conclusion is mine based upon reading fairly extensively (he is mentioned often in reform literature), listening to people in the movement discuss him as well as listening to him and talking with him during the past year.

9. Brookhiser, pp. 35-39.

10. Gary Hart and William Lind, American Can Win: The Case for Military Reform, Bethesda Maryland, Adler and Adler, 1986, pp. 5-8.

11. Ibid., pp. 5-8.

12. Ibid., pp. 5-8.

13. Brookhiser, p. 38.

14. Hart and Lind, pp. 5-8.

15. Brookhiser, p. 38.

16. Ibid., p. 43.
- 17.. Michael E. Vlakos, "Military Reform in Historical Perspective," Orbis, A Journal of World Affairs, Volume 27, Number 2, Summer 1983, pp. 251-252.
18. Ibid., p. 249.
19. Ibid., p. 250 and 252.
20. Ibid., p. 251 and 252.
21. Ibid., p. 251, 252 and 253.
22. Ibid., p. 250.
23. Ibid., p. 248.
24. Ibid., p. 246.
25. Ibid., p. 246.
26. Ibid., p. 246.
27. This figure was provided by D,PAE, HQ DA in May 1986.
28. Dr. Allen R. Millet, "Military Reform in America," Air University Review, Sep-Oct 85, p. 4.
29. Gordon H. McCormick, "The Dynamics of Doctrinal Change," in Orbis, A Journal of World Affairs. Volume 27, Number 2, Summer 1983, p. 273.

CHAPTER III

NATIONAL PLANNING

GRAND STRATEGY

The product of the national planning process is Grand Strategy which plans the application of economic, social/psychological, political and military power. The grand strategy is built through an interagency process run by the National Security Council (NSC); NSC was created for this purpose in 1947. The Interagency Groups (IG) are typically constituted of representatives from DOD, Department of State, Department of Commerce, and other agencies such as Agriculture and Transportation as needed. For the most part the national plan consists of National goals. They consider factors bearing on the interests and make assumptions about the future then develop national objectives predicated upon National interests. DOD is left to translate them into a coherent strategy. DOD then

prepares budgets and programs presumably aimed at generating capabilities to execute the strategy within likely resource constraints.¹

CLARITY PROBLEM FOR PPBES

The national goals and objectives are not very specific. This is not an indictment. They serve to guide the shorter term policies of the government but do not provide a pattern for stable military policy over the long term. Consequently, neither do they provide a stable pattern for developing a military force.

The biggest problem may be timing. While the "national plan" (contents and priorities) can change in a matter of weeks or months, it takes years to create the resource package supporting the new objectives. In all probability, when the resource package is finally put in place, as much as two presidential terms later, the national plan will have changed substantially.

There is no clear, common understanding of how the US military establishment should be designed and supported. As Jacque Gansler says,

The national security paradigm (policies, theories, organization, and resource management practices) has broken down. It has broken down due to three changes: shifts in the international balance of power; rapid technological change; changes in the operation of the federal government, especially the Congress.²

THE REALITY OF MILITARY POLICY

In reality, military policy has never been totally derived from NSC prescriptions however vague or unstable. Military policy has always been heavily influenced by international politics and domestic politics. Internationally, military capability and diplomacy influence the behavior of other states. Domestically, politics, interest groups, political parties, social classes all have conflicting interests and goals.³

As James W. Reed has indicated, the choices of the politician boil down to the following: He can respond to the cues of the foreign environment or to the cues of the domestic environment. The politician understands that the consensus on support for defense spending is fragile. Neither he nor his constituents really understand how much is

enough nor are they absolutely sure to what ends American military power should be put. Given those realities he must choose between the national interest broadly defined and the parochial interests of his constituents.⁴

Given the lack of a clear formulation of the big picture of national security needs that is persuasive, stable, and commonly accepted by the national political constituency, the politician's problem is compounded. The pressure to opt in favor of local interests becomes overwhelming.

DOD must actively and aggressively contribute to the development of the formulation. It is this stable formulation that must become the basis of strategy. It must become the basis of the long term development of resource packages to support the strategy which are funded within the context of a political consensus reflecting national values.

. ENDNOTES

1. Robert Komer, "Strategy-Making in the Pentagon," in Reorganizing America's Defense, ed. Robert J. Art, et al, Pergamon Press, McLean, VA, 1985, pp. 209-210.

2. James Fallows, "Public Participation, Political Action, and Public Policy," in The Defense Reform Debate: Issues and Analysis, ed. by Asa Clark IV, et al, the John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1984, p. 338.

3. Gansler, p. 381.

4. Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics, New York, Columbia University Press, 1961, p. 1.

CHAPTER IV

STRATEGY

THE BASIS FOR STRATEGY

As we have seen, the National Security process does not and, indeed, cannot provide the kind of stable pattern from which a comprehensive, definitive, and stable strategy and doctrine can be developed. This is critical to the person responsible for designing the national military force. Currently, he does not have at hand the compelling concepts necessary to guide his efforts over the long term. Without these concepts he has difficulty designing a national force of correct size and capability which is blind to the interests of individual services. Further, powerful persuasive concepts help sustain the national consensus supporting the force until that force is in place. It is this consensus that becomes the decisive ally of the PPBES person who is obtaining funding for the force.

The pattern typically used for development of the strategy is the three part formula offered by Carl von Clausewitz. In this three part formulation you begin with your political objective, then develop your concept of operation, then arrange for the means or resources to accomplish the strategy.¹ This is an extremely helpful formula particularly for the prosecution of a military campaign in war. In peacetime, it has a major drawback. It by definition is initiated by the political objectives coming out of this National Security Planning process and so is subject to the same instability and short term perspective. Consequently, the three part pattern fails to provide the

long term conceptual framework necessary to guide the development of the new force and the consistent, credible arguments necessary to sustain its national consensus.

Rather than to derive the direction of the long term strategic plan from the near term perspective of the National Security objectives it would be better to derive them from another notion of Clausewitz: "the center of gravity." The center of gravity is where your attention should be focused, because it is where the great vulnerability exists. The Warsaw Pact should be looking at the NATO center of gravity and NATO should be looking at the Pact's center of gravity. The center of gravity concept provides the cues to where forces should be concentrated (to attack or defend centers of gravity). It provides the cues for economy of force (to attack or defend what is militarily significant but not decisive).²

CENTER OF GRAVITY ARGUMENT

An example of a possible use of the Center of Gravity concept would be instructive. The example is based upon the lessons learned by the author at the War College during the past year but the construction is the author's.

During the current period of an adversarial relationship with the Soviet Union, but no open conflict, the US center of gravity is the retention of a force sufficiently large and powerful to prevent Soviet capture of the entire Eurasian continent. To maintain a force this large two things must happen: The US must maintain its NATO alliance and the US must support a substantial conventional force.

The US and alliances must retain a large conventional force because nuclear parity has reduced the credibility of our nuclear response in the face of a conventional attack and made the Soviet's huge conventional land forces militarily ascendant in Europe.³

THE ALLIANCE

The alliance must be retained for two reasons. First, Western Europe is the center of gravity of the current world order. If Western Europe were to fall to the Soviets, the world would be substantially different. This difference would be substantially to the detriment of the US. Our economic well-being would suddenly become an issue and our survival as a nation could become an issue. Second, the US could not fight the Soviets in Western Europe without the full cooperation and participation of an alliance.

The center of gravity of the alliance is the Rhine River. If the Rhine is breached, only unacceptable events can happen. No one is sure which things will happen, but the alternatives are several. In one alternative, the alliance would almost surely begin to unravel quickly with Germany defeated and with individual nations seeking separate accommodations with the Soviets. In another alternative, the US could respond with tactical nuclear weapons and this could very likely escalate quickly. France's Force de Frappe could respond with a strategic nuclear strike against the Soviet Union. In the last alternative, the Soviet's could just keep going until they had conquered the remainder of the continent.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DESIGN OF FORCES

What this implies to the designer of forces is that the conventional forces of the alliance must be capable of either deterring Soviet attack or containing a Soviet attack once launched and preventing its breaching the Rhine. This further implies that the forces of the NATO defense (i.e., the place where forces should be concentrated) is the central front. The central front is a 100 km zone stretching from Schleswig Holstein in the North to the Alps in the South. The focus of the defense is not northern Norway or Soviet Asia. Though they are of sufficient importance to warrant an economy of force they do not constitute the center of gravity of the defense. To contain the huge Warsaw pact forces, NATO forces in the central front must be large, sufficiently large to provide a substantial strategic reserve to contain major penetrations of the pact east of the Rhine. Further, the ease with which forces on the ground will contain the pact will be a function of the density and quality of their equipment. Density and quality will make easier the containment of the first echelon of the Warsaw Pact. Quality, particularly from the perspective of technological virtuosity will make easier the necessary weakening of the Warsaw Pact's second echelon.

Density and quality will also be critical in the first days of a Warsaw Pact attack in as much as the margin of capability provided by their presence would buy precious time as the US moves the reserve from CONUS to Europe. This is fact may be the most important consideration to the force designer of peacetime forces. The importance of technological superiority for US land forces is not so much for their

contribution to a protracted conflict but rather for the time that they buy to allow the US to deploy and prepare for the longer fight.

As the US decides how to allocate its national resources, center of gravity analysis points to some interesting conclusions.

- The center of gravity of the current world order is a zone in Germany bordered by the Inter-German border in front and the Rhine in the rear. Defense of this zone is second only in importance to the defense of the US territory itself.

- Successful defense of the zone in the short term requires a large conventional force with dense levels of technically superior equipment.

- Successful defense of this zone in the longer term requires the rapid movement of large quantities of US forces to the zone in time to form a strategic reserve.

- Of course other theaters in the world are important to the US, but in no other theater is the potential result so time dependent. In the other theaters, the results are reversible over time. In the Central front if the Rhine is breached before the reinforcement of the line and creation of the reserves, the result will be catastrophic and irreversible.

- When the government is faced with the need to find some defense requirement and not others, then it must give the conventional defense of the central front top priority over other conventional defense needs.

- Center of Gravity analysis clearly implies that SLOCs south of the GIUK gap must be protected in order that troops and supplies can be moved to the true center of gravity, the central front. Large scale

offensive naval capability north of the gap and at the Soviet periphery at the expense of the concentration of forces at the central front creates an economy of force capability at the center of gravity and provides dominant concentrations of forces in locations which will not be decisive. This clearly suggests that the 600 ship navy was/is mistaken. The 600 ship navy has a clear military utility, but given the need for a choice between a 600 ship Navy and a substantially improved land force, the program to support the 600 ship navy is clearly a case of buying the wrong conventional force.

- Center of gravity analysis points to the need for purchasing sufficient quantities of transportation by sea and air to assure movement capacity sufficient to deploy a force that can be decisive within the near term, i.e., before the pact breaches the Rhine.

- Center of gravity analysis points to the need for substantial levels of combat support and combat service support troops in the peacetime force structure. Given that it takes longer to generate these types of forces than it does combat forces, they must be maintained at levels somewhat in excess of the pure ratios suggested by the current level of combat force structure. If we do not do that then we assure that deployment of a growing force will not be bottlenecked due to the unavailability of combat support and combat service support troops.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the center of gravity analysis offers many advantages. It provides a stable concept upon which people who design the force and who need to sustain the consensus supporting the force can

"hang their hats" over time. Thus it overcomes the weakness of the national planning process but stays in tune with it (national interests and national political objectives must themselves be ultimately derived from an understanding of centers of gravity).

Center of Gravity analysis proceeds from the understanding that, indeed, the national planning process is insufficient for the needs of PPBES, just as the reformers suggest. It offers the conceptual framework for providing a correct, stable pattern for developing and supporting the consensus for the force. The success of the 600 ship navy is strong evidence of the virtue of a clear, stable concept. Because it was not based upon center of gravity analysis it was wrong-- just as the reformers suggest.

On the other hand, the reformers suggest that we need a leaner ratio of combat to combat support and combat service support. Center of gravity analysis points out that this opinion does not sufficiently respect the relationship between levels of support forces and the ability to create combat forces quickly.

Center of gravity analysis also supports the value of technology for our peacetime Army. It is seen as crucial to our being able to defend in the short terms the narrow zone in Germany that protects the true center of gravity of the Western World order--the Rhine river. This runs contrary to one of the major thrusts of the reform movement--namely a suspicion of technology. Granted we should use technology to make production cheaper and products more reliable, but we also must make weapons more capable in order to help provide the decisive margin on the western front. Center of gravity analysis points to the need to wage a high firepower attrition war in the early stages of the war in order

to buy time by stalling the Warsaw Pact first echelon long enough to get the strategic reserve in place and weakening the second echelon so that it will not be decisive. It is only after the reserves are in place that the alliance can consider the possibility for the maneuver warfare now dear to the hearts of reformers.

The virtue of the reform movement is that it has made us look at some important issues. The fact that it has sometimes missed the mark in terms of suggested solutions does not mean that the contribution of the movement should be dismissed. Nevertheless, the errors of the movement should be argued against effectively and stubbornly because of their potential effect on the national consensus and ultimately on the decisions emanating from the political process. Center of gravity analysis provides the stable, persuasive basis for dealing with the the movements argument and effectively influencing the national consensus over time.

ENDNOTES

1. James Reed, "Congress and the Politics of Defense Reform," The Defense Reform Debate: Issues and Analysis, ed. by Asa Clark IV, et al, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1984, p. 338.

2. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Pant, Princeton, New Jersey Princeton University Press, 1976.

3. Ibid.

CHAPTER V

THE CONGRESS

A discussion of Congress has been implicit in this paper to this point. As observed earlier, Congress is the primary allocator of national values. In allocating values the Congress is particularly sensitive to the consensus it perceives to exist within its constituency. Further, as observed earlier, in the absence of a national defense paradigm supported by a national consensus it is fairly difficult to resist the considerable pressure applied from various directions but particularly from the home district/state. "Most Congressmen specialize in those subjects which bring home the bacon, i.e., jobs and financial solvency back home."¹ It is natural that many would bring this perspective to the review of the Defense portion of the budget.

This natural tendency has combined with other trends leading to much greater scrutiny of the budget by the Congress. One reason has been the greater involvement of the Armed Services Committees in the review of the budget due largely to rivalry with the appropriations committees. Another reason was a distrust of the "imperial presidency" and an antimilitary mood in the 1970s. A further reason, has been the expansion of the staff capability in the 1970s.²

The growth of the staff is fairly interesting. For most of our history, the "expertise" of government resided in the bureaucracy and the Congress had access to that expertise through hearings, etc. Current bureaucratic theorists such as Michael Altfeld find that bureaucrats use their inside and secret information strategically. That

is to say, the bureaucrats present information in a way that would serve the interests of their bureaucratic organization. When pressed, they would more often than not lie in order to win. Studies also conclude that bureaucrats also obtain implicit leverage from their strong influence or if not control of the agenda of the government.³

Congress then saw stronger and larger staffs as necessary to provide their own sources of expertise.⁴ The irony of course is that the staff structure supporting the congress is now also sizeable enough to be viewed as a bureaucracy and thus subject to the same failings.

The growth in the involvement of the Congress in the DOD budget is reflected in the Tables at Annex B.⁵ These tables list the number of pages in the committees' (appropriation and authorization) reports on the DOD budget. Since 1960 the number of pages has grown from steadily and geometrically from 194 to 1361. Not reflected in that data is the involvement of the two budget committees set up by the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1972.

Les Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed Services committee does not see the elaborate new staff structure as being decisive. To quote him:

What many advocates of Congressional Reform really seem to want is...to turn Congress into a kind of Brookings Institution or Systems Analysis office studying alternative budgets and making decisions about how much is enough. They would like to see Congress gathering and weighing information and making rational decisions in that basis, but they fail to take into account that Congress is based on politics. Legislative conflicts in Congress are resolved more often than not by political pressure, not by any rational presentation of issues.⁶

This is a key observation. Mechanical fixes to Congress's budget review procedures such as more multiyear contracting and biennial

budgeting can smooth the process. In particular it can reduce some of the turbulence of the materiel acquisition process and reduce costs by making possible more stable "buys." However, DOD and the Army must never lose sight of the fact that such fixes will not be decisive. What will always be decisive is politics. Politics are driven by the perceived consensus that is relevant to the politician, e.g., district, state or financial contributor. The key to influencing the political consensus is a clear, stable persuasive vision derived from an orderly and stable examination of our true national interests. Such a vision can proceed accurately and effectively from the use of center of gravity analysis. With such a vision as the steady reference point then the Army and/or indeed the entire DOD establishment can sound the same theme, and continually reinforce it in all of its public utterances and actions. Such consistency of argument and power of argument repeated over time are the key to altering the public consensus.

ENDNOTES

1. John M. Collins, U.S. Defense Planning - A Critique, Boulder Colorado, Westview Press Inc., 1982, p. 74.
2. Robert J. Art, "Congress and the Defense Budget: Enhancing Policy Oversight" in Reorganizing America's Defense, ed. by Robert J. Art et al, McLean Virginia, Pergamon Press, Inc., 1985, pp. 409-410.
3. Michael F. Altfield and Gary J. Miller, "Sources of Bureaucratic Influence: Expertise and Agenda Control." Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol 28, No. 4, December 1984, pp. 701-730.
4. See Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, PL. 93-344. For background see Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1974, Congressional Quarterly, Inc., Washington, D.C., p. 146.
5. Vincent Puritano, "Resource Allocation in the Pentagon," in Reorganizing America's Defense, ed. by Robert J. Art et al, Pergamon Press, McLean, VA 1985, pp. 410 and 411.

6. Quoted in James Reed, "Congress and the Politics of Defense Reform," The Defense Reform Debate: Issues and Analysis, ed. by Asa V. Clark, IV et al., The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London,, 1984, p.. 242.

CHAPTER VI

THE BUREAUCRACY

The Department of Defense is a bureaucracy. Reformers don't like bureaucracy; they say that it stifles the initiative of warriors.¹ They imply that we have too much bureaucracy. Luttwak says that we have so much bureaucracy because we need a place to put all of the military officers that we have.²

Actually, the essence of a bureaucracy is that its organization is predicated upon the division of labor. The extent of the division of labor is a function of the size of the organization and the multiplicity and complexity of the subject matter areas with which they have to deal. The size of the armed forces since 1950 have contributed to the creation and maintenance of a huge bureaucracy. The increasing diversity of technology and capabilities created a parallel (and necessary) diversity in the bureaucracy.

Bureaucracies are all hierarchal. Every component is part of a vertical line of authority. However; things get done horizontally. To assure horizontal coordination, bureaucracies have rules and regulations. The larger the organization, the more difficult it is for rules and regulations to assure coordination. The classical solution for this problem is "gang planking", i.e., coordination is assured because of horizontal relationships between people.³ In DOD this gang planking is largely performed by military who have been increasingly socialized during their careers. This is the reason, a valid reason, that the leadership of this bureaucracy is predominantly military. To eliminate military from these jobs is not to eliminate the bureaucracy,

it is merely to replace the military with civilians. To do this is merely to replace one form of careerism with another and to lose many of the gang planking advantages of a socialized military. Gary Hart says that there is an alternative to the bureaucratic model. He calls this

the socialized model which seeks to persuade all who work within the organization to focus on its overall objectives.⁴

In actuality the socialized model (or Japanese model) is not an alternative to bureaucracy; rather, it is an enhancement. No technology has been developed which allows us to dispense with the division of labor as the organizing principle for an organization of substantial scale. To the extent that a socialized model is feasible it is most easily predicated upon military leaders in gang planking positions loyal to the kind of stable, persuasive overall goals derived from center of gravity type analysis.

The great weakness in the DCD Bureaucracy is that it is a hierarchy without a strong leadership. This is by definition a contradiction. Leadership from the top is inherent in the notion of bureaucracy. Given the need for a strong leadership at the top, one must be created which can develop legitimate center of gravity type analysis which serves as the basis of a coherent national strategy and national force structure.

If such a leadership cannot be put in place then the services must fend for themselves. This would essentially mean an Air Force -Army center of gravity based vision competing with an erroneous maritime strategy. In the long term, such a coalition would probably prevail in influencing the national consensus and the Congress, given the power of center of gravity reasoning and the Army's reputation for being honest--

a reputation that it may not have sufficiently employed to its own ends.⁵

In summary, the reform movement's assumptions about the military bureaucracy appear to stem from a dismissal of the imperatives of organizing modern complex institutions. We must organize them bureaucratically, there is no alternative; unfortunately, there are certain inherent shortcomings. The socialization solution to which reformers point can only be achieved through people who are socialized such as the military leadership in place, but such a solution cannot eliminate the need for bureaucracies per-se. Any bureaucracy assumes strong leadership at the top and JCS must be adjusted accordingly.

ENDNOTES

1. Lewis, p. 286-287.
2. Edward M. Lurtwak, The Pentagon and the Art of War. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985.
3. Henry Fayol, General and Industrial Management, p. 35.
4. Gary Hart, Member of the United States Senate, "The Need for Military Reform," Air University Review, Sept-Oct 1985, pp. 41-46.
5. This reputation for honesty on the part of the Army is something that the author has heard again and again from DOD, OMB and even members of Congress.

CHAPTER VII

PPBES

PLANNING

The problem is planning. Up to this point what we have pointed to is the need for a planning process which flows from a stable, persuasive center of gravity analysis. Such a process serves as a bench mark for the designers of the force as well as a theme for those organizing support for the funding of the force. With this bench mark then the design process will truly drive the funding process rather than the other way around as is now the case.

PROGRAMMING, BUDGETING AND EXECUTION

Programming must be understood as the implementation of a decision making process. It flowed from the conclusions of the systems school of thought. This school of thought contends that most decisions are made in the middle of an organization. It is in the middle of organization that sufficient expertise exists to make choices; it is the middle which maintains contact with the relevant membership of the external environment.

The problem with the current system in the Army is that the decision making process is so diffused and frenetic at the lower levels that it is difficult for the process to generate its own focus. Center of gravity analysis would help sharpen that focus.

In Budgeting and execution the consideration is the same. Namely, keep the Army's resource package in tune with the general themes proceeding from the center of gravity analysis. The COLM's system now being implemented will help make this feasible.

The major challenge in FEBES is selling the resource package to DOD and the Congress. Center of gravity analysis makes this much easier because of the stable, persuasive vision that flows from it. It also offers the vehicle for the long term building of the political consensus. "Be all you can be" is the best current example of the Army's ability to develop a stable, persuasive message. We can do the same thing for our total resource package.

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ANNEX A

MILITARY REFORM CAUCUS MEMBERS

Pryor	Trible
Hart	Johnston
Grassley	Cohen
Kassebaum	Ell
Bingaman	Mitchell
Sasser	Specter
Gorton	Baucus
Andrews	Riegle
Beschwitz	Harkin
Nunn	Bentsen
Levin	Boren
Rudman	Gore
Benton	Simon

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RESERVE MILITARY REFERENCE CENTER

15. 3R

Gary Z. Levitt
Tony McNamee, Jr.
C. W. Baker
B. May - Doll
Anthony Williams
Doug. Williams
Howard Williams
Thomas Wiley, Jr.
David Winkler
Barbara F. ...
Bernie ...
Albert ...
Rod Chandler
Dick Cheney
William H. Chisney, Jr.
Tony Concho
Rob Coleman
Jim ...
Janet ...
Thomas A. ...
Norman ...
By ...
Thomas ...
Robert ...
Dorothy ...
Elizabeth ...
Gregory ...
V. ...
The ...
Justin ...
Robert ...
Mark ...
Ben ...
Bill ...
Steve ...
William ...
Dorothy ...
John ...
William ...
James ...
Mary ...
John ...
Ken ...
John ...
Tom ...

Norman ...
Sander ...
Mel Leve ...
Jim Lightfoot
Bob Livingston
Dan Luntzen
Roman Mineta
David O'Brien
Lynn Martin
Robert Matus
Jim Morby
Sid Morrison
Howard Nielson
Don Peone
Harry Reid
Thomas Ridge
Toby Roth
Marg Routhen
Dan Schaefer
Claudine Schaefer
R. James Sennett, Jr.
Philip R. Sharp
Ron Sikorick
Bob Smith
Denny Smith
Larry Smith
John M. Spirelli
Forrest Clark
Charles Stender
Thomas Teller
Vin ...
G. Wild ...
Paul W. ...
Edward ...
John ...
Bill Young
Ed ...

John ...
Pat ...
L. ...
Jim ...

*denotes congressional caucus

CONGRESS AND THE DEFENSE BUDGET

Table 20.3 Number of Pages in
Armed Services Committees Report on DOD Authorizations
(major reports only)

FISCAL YEAR	HOUSE	SENATE	TOTAL
1965	63	17	80
1969	91	31	122
1970	176	70	246
1971	95	121	216
1972	107	140	247
1973	115	177	292
1974	150	205	355
1975	132	190	322
1976	185	191	376
1977	169	204	373
1978	160	163	323
1979	163	158	321
1980	186	166	352
1981	171	242	413
1982	228	197	425
1983	233	222	455
1984	332	526	858

Source: Armed Services Committees Yearly Reports on the DOD Authorizations.

Table 20.2 Number of Pages in
Appropriation Committees' Reports on DOD Budget

FISCAL YEAR	HOUSE	SENATE	TOTAL
1960	83	31	114
1961	74	47	126
1964	70	69	129
1965	51	52	103
1968	67	71	138
1969	68	56	124
1970	102	141	243
1971	119	221	340
1972	139	210	349
1973	256	204	460
1974	259	173	412
1975	171	207	378
1976	358	302	660
1977	226	277	503
1978	387	295	682
1979	446	217	663
1980	493	219	712
1981	398	227	625
1982	315	137	452
1983	259	157	416
1984	298	205	503

END

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